So this view takes us back to the first beginning: even if we have a moral obligation to obey the law, what degree of moral obligation do we have, and when do we prevail over our other moral obligations? It is often assumed that moral obligations and moral rules apply to the treatment of human corpses and nonhuman animals. Taking these claims into account illustrates how moral obligations and moral rules can be recognized in the absence of corresponding rights. Consider the treatment of human corpses. Some religions believe that the treatment of corpses is about the person whose body it was, but most people recognize the moral rule that they must treat human corpses with respect, even if they subscribe to such a belief. (The behavior considered respectful depends on the culture. For example, autopsies are considered disrespectful in some cultures.) There are a variety of reasons to believe that people should treat corpses with respect. A very common one is that if we don`t treat human corpses with respect, we risk becoming insensitive to living people. Another, more common in ancient times, is that a person can be confused with dead. Austin, John | Bentham, Jeremy | Stowaway problem| Law: and language| Nature of the right | Nature of Law: Interpretivist Theories | Nature of the law: legal positivism | Nature of Law: Pure Legal Theory Slavery in the United States is often used as an example.
“Of course,” a good modern citizen would say, “slavery was bad, even though it was legal.” The adoption of 13. The amendment did not make slavery morally reprehensible; This was already wrong, and the legal structures eventually caught up with the moral structures. Sociologists believe that obligations lead people to act in ways that society deems acceptable. Every society has its own way of governing, it expects its citizens to behave in a certain way. Citizens must not only conform to social norms, they want to do so to adapt to society. [4] Philosophers, on the other hand, maintain that rational beings have moral duties, they make the choice to fulfill these moral duties or to ignore them. They have a moral responsibility to fulfill their obligations. Duty is seen as a response to an individual`s obligations.
Obligations require that an action be taken, and duty is the execution of that action. [5] Sociologists believe that obligation is an objective force, but philosophers believe that obligations are moral imperatives. [4] Others claim that it regresses the relationship. First, it is doubtful that one can be forced to obey an illegitimate regime. As Rawls puts it, “appropriation or even consent to manifestly unjust institutions does not create obligations” (Rawls 1971, 343; but cf. Simmons 1979, 78-79). If so, at least some conditions of legitimacy precede a commitment to obedience. Second, there is good reason to believe that we would have no obligation to comply if the law did not already have the right to maintain its requirements “with steel.” A legal system that cannot exert justified coercion cannot guarantee to law-abiding people that recalcitrants will not regard them as fools.
Without being able to solve this insurance problem, it would be unfair to impose obligations on them and unfair to demand their obedience. This proposal is based on the well-known idea that effectiveness is a necessary, but certainly not sufficient, condition for a justified authority. (See Kelsen 1967, 46-50; cf. Finnis 1979, 250) The correlational view of authority commitment is not generally accepted. Some argue that legal authority does not imply a right of reclamation, but only a set of freedoms: to decide certain matters for a society and enforce its decisions. (Soper 2002, 85 ff; cf. Ladenson 1980; Greenawalt, 1987; 47–61; and Edmundson, 1998, pp. 7-70). The concept of freedom must answer two questions. First, is it not a characteristic of a right of decision that it obliges subjects not to react to competing decisions? If the law says that abortion is permitted, and the Church says it is not, what does it mean to deny the Church`s right to decide, if not that public order should be structured by the first decision and not by the second, even if the second is correct? Second, does the right to enforcement imply an obligation for subjects to pay the penalty if necessary? If so, then it is only an abbreviated version of the correlative theory of obligations – a theory that states that punitive and restorative obligations, but not primary obligations, are binding.
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