As the maxims themselves imply, the general position of the judiciary regarding voluntary assignments is quite strict. In the case of gifts of cheap goods, this may be less the case because assignability is primarily a matter of intent, although in some cases, such as advantageous fiduciary interests, written form may be required. However, in the case of legal property, the rule in Milroy v. Lord applies to determine the validity of the alleged assignment in equity. There are different formulations as to how this rule, in particular Part One, is to be applied. But even after the more moderate formulations of Chief Justice Griffith or Latham J. in Anning v. Anning, for example, it is still quite heavy. In the past, gifts in return for suicide were considered contrary to public order. It seems that if the donee considered suicide or not at the time of the donation, the principle does not apply. The classic statement of essential elements in Cain against the Moon above postulates a difference between gifts given in contemplation of death and cases where there is an “expectation.” It is not enough to establish a donatio mortis causa that the donor or producer had only a certain expectation of dying at the time of the donation. Nor is it sufficient that the manufacturer was obviously old, tired, weak or sick, or that he had a subjective fear that his condition was fragile and would likely result in imminent expiration. This is, of course, evidence that the courts can consider as factors in drawing appropriate conclusions.
What must be clearly established, whether by direct or circumstantial evidence, is that the gift itself was made in consideration of death.  It has been suggested that Sen/Headley can be isolated and treated as explainable, since it was specifically a country not registered in the United Kingdom. However, there is nothing in the judgment to support such an argument. Such a transaction occurs when, to quote Blackstone, a person “in his last illness,” “who fears his dissolution nearby, returns to another or has handed over to another possession personal property that he can keep in the event of death.”  This type of operation originated in Roman law, where it appeared to be the product of attempts to circumvent technical or formal elements of inheritance law. Roman law allowed such transactions between a man and a woman because they were gifts given during a valid marriage.  In Roman law, contrary to the general trend in common law systems, gifts could be made in respect of any type of property that could be alienated in a will, including land or shares of land. Is it necessary that the intention to make a donatio mortis causa takes place at the same time as the delivery? This does not appear to be the case. In Cain v. Moon, above, it was suggested that delivery could take place after the intention to make the donation has been formed. In that case, during an illness from which she had recovered, the deceased gave the defendant a payment slip and asked her to keep it. The object then remained in the recipient`s possession.
About two years later, the decedent suffered a relapse of the disease and died. During this time, the testator informed the recipient that the ticket belonged to her in case she died. A valid donatio mortis causa was considered valid, although the ticket was handed over before the donation. This principle appears to have been adopted in the Canadian decision in Chauvel v. Adams Estate.  3)The gift must be made in circumstances that show that it can be revoked when the donor recovers. (1) The gift must have been in consideration of death; A donatio mortis causa is a gift that remains conditional and becomes effective only upon the death of the donor. If the donation is valid, the object passes to the recipient in the event of death without going through the estate of the deceased.
If ownership of land has not been validly transferred and has not been revoked prior to death, the donor`s personal representatives will hold the property in trust for the donee and may be compelled to transfer it to the donee. That was the case here. In conventional terms, a donatio mortis causa (or what is called a gift causa mortis in the United States) is a transfer of ownership that occurs in anticipation or anticipation of the death of the producer. It is a kind of conditional transfer of ownership; That is, it is a transfer that transfers ownership to the beneficiary or donee immediately after its act, but provided that the death of the testator occurs shortly thereafter.  Gifts in anticipation of death, a gift made in contemplation, but not necessarily in immediate anticipation of death in circumstances that show that it only takes effect in the event of death, are valid revocable gifts. They can be revocable if the donor does not die or recover. However, the English Court of Appeal decided otherwise. In Sen v. Headley (1991) 2 All ER 636, the deceased handed over the keys to a steel box containing title deeds to the deceased`s real estate. The court found that “the deceased had unquestionably donated the house to the plaintiff by reason of his death in order to be effective at his death, and that his separation from the dominion over the title deeds to the house was sufficient to satisfy one-third of the conditions necessary for the establishment of a valid donatio mortis causa”. Kemp In this case, a mother entered into a marriage contract in exchange for her eldest son`s marriage to bequeath a quarter of her property to that son, his executors or administrators until his last will. The wedding took place as planned.
Notwithstanding the undertaking, the mother feared that, following her son`s death, the corresponding share of her property would go to others. Thus, shortly before her own death, she set out to dispose of $2,000 in cash. These gifts of money were made partly to his daughter and partly to his grandchildren`s trustees. The Court held that the testamentary contract did not prevent the mother from “disposing of her estate in any way during her lifetime”. However, he said she could not “intentionally make a distribution to defeat the Federation.”  The mother`s orders were alleged to be “a clear fraud”.  It was concluded, however, that the gifts were nevertheless adonatio mortis causa and that the covenant in the marriage contract “had escaped by disposition one or two days before the death.”  In Re Rosemergey, 49 BC, R.93, the deceased had employed her housekeeper for many years. When she became ill and learned that her condition was incurable, the deceased had signed and handed over a paper that gave her housekeeper all the furniture and personal effects of the house. None of the items mentioned in the written memorandum were mentioned in the deceased`s will. In this particular context, explicit trusts generally reflect an equally voluntary character of those who create them, yet both are clearly outside the scope of the rule in Milroy v. Lord and outside the application of the two maxims mentioned above. It is perhaps more unusual that, from a material point of view, only the appointment of the trustee distinguishes between a voluntary sale or gift of property and the establishment of a trust.